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The effects of feedback equivocality, information availability, and prior decision-making history on
escalation and persistence were investigated. Replicating the findings of J.L. Bragger, D.H. Bragger,
D.A. Hantula, and J.P. Kirnan (1998), this study found that participants receiving equivocal feedback on
their decisions invested more money and invested across more opportunities; those who could purchase
information invested fewer resources than did participants who did not have the opportunity to purchase
information. There was an inverse linear relationship between the percentage of opportunities in which
participants purchased information and the delay to exit decisions and total resources invested. Six weeks
earlier, some participants took part in a more profitable investment scenario, and prior experience led to
later increased investing when participants were faced with failure, even above that invested in a
preceding, succeeding scenario. These results are consistent with an equivocality theory account of
escalation.
For more than 20 years, researchers have been intrigued by a
phenomenon labeled by social psychologists as the sunk cost effect
(“the negative cash flows experienced in anticipation of future
compensating positive cash flows”; Northcraft & Wolf, 1984, p.
226; see also Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990), by econo-
mists as hysteresis (the “failure of an effect to reverse itself after
its underlying cause has reversed itself”; Dixit, 1992, p. 122; see
also Cross, 1993; Davidson, 1993; Dixit, 1989a; Katzner, 1993),
and by organizational psychologists as escalation of commitment
(“the tendency for decision makers to persist with failing courses
of action”; Brockner, 1992, p. 39; see also Staw, 1976; Staw &
Ross, 1989). Although much of the research has been developed
along separate lines and has been disparate even within disciplines,
the basic conceptualization of the phenomenon is similar. Hyster-
esis and escalation of commitment are situations in which there is
an initial investment of resources, some indication of nonprofit
making, and continued investment in the face of negative
feedback.
The study of escalation of commitment and hysteresis is impor-
tant to social and organizational psychology because of its rele-
vance in organizations and to economics because it represents
apparent anomalies. The 1986 World Expo held in Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada (Ross & Staw, 1986), the New Coke
debacle (Whyte, 1991), the Taurus IT project in the United King-
dom (Drummond, 1997, 1998), and the Vietnam War (Staw, 1976)
are just a few prominent examples of escalation situations identi-
fied in the literature. Other illustrations of escalation include
continued support of nonproductive employees (Bazerman,
Beekun, & Schoorman, 1982; Drummond, 1994a; Staw & Huang,
1995), problem bank loans (Staw, Barsade, & Koput, 1997), and
persistent use of unsuccessful strategies (Tang, 1988).
A reason for escalation’s enduring hold on researchers may be
due to its apparent violation of rationality assumptions, with es-
calation viewed as erroneous decisions that are irrational according
to economic principles (Garland, Sandefur, & Rogers, 1990; Staw,
1976; Staw & Ross, 1989). Traditional investment theory holds
that financial investment should occur when the value of a re-
source (investment) exceeds the long-run average cost of staying
in the economic market and that investment should cease when its
value falls below average variable cost (Dixit, 1989a, 1992; Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994; Marshall, 1898/1949). In the past, if investment
did not obey these “laws of rationality” then, according to tradi-
tional economic theory, such decisions were irrational (Ingersoll &
Ross, 1992). According to expected utility theory, individuals and
firms show preference for conditions of profit over those of non-
profit and should consistently display this preference by exiting a
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situation as soon as feedback indicates that the situation is non-
profitable (Camerer, 1995).
In contrast, Bowen’s (1987) equivocality theory of escalation
proposes that in escalation situations, decision makers are not
necessarily making erroneous decisions but instead are responding
as best they can to highly uncertain information. Escalation is seen
as an attempt to, or a by-product of attempts to, make sense of a
highly conflicting and confusing environment. A growing line of
research drawing from economics and psychology suggests that
continued investment under failure may not always be irrational
but rather an adaptation to difficult decision dilemmas (Drum-
mond, 1998; Goltz, 1992, 1993, 1999; Hantula & Crowell, 1994;
Hantula & Bragger, 1999; Ingersoll & Ross, 1992). Delays to exit
decisions under nonprofitable circumstances may be adaptive un-
der conditions of equivocality; investors may delay entrance or
exit in investment situations because conditions may quickly
change (Busby & Pitts, 1995; Dixit, 1989a, 1992; George &
Morisset, 1993; Hubbard, 1994; Pindyck, 1993; Price, 1995).
Continued investment may occur until uncertainty is reduced or
until investing is so overwhelmingly unprofitable that it overrides
any level of uncertainty. If failure is foregone, an investor can only
lose by delaying an exit decision, but in a world fraught with
equivocality, there is value in waiting because the worth of the
investment may change in the future (Bartolini, 1992; Cukierman,
1980; Ingersoll & Ross, 1992). Effects of equivocality become
more pronounced when there are sunk and exit costs associated
with entering and exiting situations (Bernanke, 1983; Campa,
1993; Cukierman, 1980; Dixit, 1992; Episcopos, 1995; Garland &
Newport, 1991), when decisions to exit an investment situation
cannot be easily reversed (Henry, 1974a, 1974b; Ramani & Rich-
ard, 1993), or when a project appears close to completion (Garland
& Conlon, 1998). With higher transaction costs of entering and
exiting an investment and increased levels of irreversibility, con-
tinued investment in nonprofitable situations is more adaptive in
an equivocal world. The passage of time allows decision makers to
gather more information about the investment situation; the more
equivocality is involved, the more valuable information becomes.
Such equivocality also makes any information, whether it is pre-
dictive or prescriptive, more valuable to the decision maker.
Hence, in a very real sense, one may be dealing less with escala-
tion and more with a search for information.
Bragger, Bragger, Hantula, and Kirnan (1998) synthesized the-
ory from economics and psychology to test effects of feedback
equivocality (operationalized as variability and absence of pattern-
ing) and availability of information on exit decisions in a failing
venture. A pharmaceutical marketing microworld (DiFonzo, Han-
tula, & Bordia, 1998) was used in which participants played the
role of vice president for marketing, half of the participants re-
ceived feedback that was relatively low in equivocality, and half
received feedback that was substantially higher in equivocality.
Half of the participants in each equivocality condition had the
opportunity to purchase additional information about their invest-
ment. Participants receiving feedback that was higher in equivo-
cality delayed exit decisions longer, invested more often, and
invested more resources than did those receiving feedback that was
lower in equivocality. Participants with no opportunity to purchase
information delayed exit decisions longer, invested more often,
and invested more resources than did those who had the opportu-
nity to purchase information. These results are consistent with
predictions from theory in the economics of uncertainty (Cukier-
man, 1980; Dixit, 1992) as well as research in organizational
psychology (DiFonzo & Bordia, 1997; Goltz, 1992, 1993; Hantula
& Crowell, 1994).
According to this line of thinking, the organizational world is a
place of great uncertainty, and exposure to this world teaches
individuals to continue to invest under conditions that may not be
clearly profitable (Chi & Nystrom, 1995; McCain, 1986). Indeed,
past research in psychology has found that previous experience
with a variable reinforcement schedule in an investment simulation
engenders escalation, whereas experience with continuous or a
fixed schedule of returns does not (Goltz, 1992, 1993; Hantula &
Crowell, 1994). Goltz (1992) suggested that decision makers gen-
eralize from stimuli associated with past experiences to new ex-
periences and behave accordingly. However, research investigat-
ing feedback history on financial decision making has focused on
the history of feedback given to participants who are investing in
one scenario over the course of one laboratory session, and the
effects may be somewhat attributable to momentum (Goltz, 1999).
Further, financial decision making in organizations occurs over
days, months, and even years. If, as is suggested by past research,
decision makers learn to continue to invest in uncertain situations
from a history of feedback, then it is likely that prior decision-
making experience in a more successful but still uncertain scenario
that is remote in time from a current decision-making experience
will result in a greater delay to exit on later exposure to a less
profitable situation. Thus, in the present study we examined pos-
sible history effects in a systematic replication and extension of
Bragger et al.’s (1998) study.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Participants who receive relatively uncertain feedback
will reinvest more resources and invest in more trials than will
participants who receive relatively certain feedback, replicating Brag-
ger et al. (1998).
Hypothesis 2: Participants with the opportunity to purchase informa-
tion regarding their investment will exit sooner and invest fewer
resources than will those participants with no opportunity to purchase
such information, replicating Bragger et al. (1998).
Hypothesis 3: Given the opportunity to purchase information about
their investments, participants who purchase a greater amount of
information will delay exit decisions less and invest fewer resources
than will participants who purchase less information, replicating Brag-
ger et al. (1998).
Hypothesis 4: Participants who complete a more profitable but similar
financial decision-making scenario prior to participating in the failing
scenario will invest in more trials and invest more resources in the
failing scenario than will those participants who do not have such
prior experience.
Hypothesis 5: Participants who complete a more profitable but similar
financial decision-making scenario will invest more resources and
invest in more trials in the second failing decision-making scenario
than will these same participants in the first decision-making scenario.
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Method
Participants
Students (N  136) who were enrolled in undergraduate psychology
courses participated as an extra credit option and for the opportunity to earn
$20 for having the highest profits.
Apparatus
A microworld (DiFonzo et al. 1998) simulation written in Delphi pro-
gramming language implemented two different investment scenarios on
Pentium class computers.
Scenario
The failing scenario in which all participants worked was the same as
that used by Bragger et al. (1998). Participants assumed the role of a vice
president of marketing for an American pharmaceutical company that had
the opportunity to invest in the marketing of a new product. Participants
could continue to invest in the marketing of the product until they decided
to quit or until they expended their entire budget. The decision to exit was
irreversible. Once participants decided not to invest, the experiment ended.
About half of the participants took part in a similar but more profitable
financial decision-making scenario about 6 weeks prior to participating in
the failing scenario in which they assumed the role of vice president of
marketing for a computer software company that was trying to increase its
sales.
Procedure
After instructions and a sample investment opportunity were presented,
participants began to invest in the marketing of the product. If participants
chose to invest at each opportunity, they were asked how much they
wanted to invest (up to $10,000 in multiples of $1,000) by entering the
amount into the computer. The feedback was the amount that profits were
above costs or that costs were above profits in dollars and a time-series
graph indicating net costs or profits. In the initial scenario (for those
participants who invested in two scenarios), feedback was variable with a
mean profit of $400. After their fifth and after their last investment
opportunities, participants were asked to fill out questionnaires that
checked the manipulation of perceived uncertainty and responsibility.
Independent Variables
Prior experience. All participants were exposed to the second failing
financial decision-making scenario. About half were randomly chosen to
also participate in the more profitable decision-making scenario prior to the
failing investment to determine the effect of previous exposure to uncer-
tainty, resulting in a more profitable outcome. Participants took part in the
second failing scenario about 6 weeks after their participation in the first
scenario.
Uncertainty. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high or
low uncertainty condition. Variance of the financial feedback that partic-
ipants received was manipulated to be either high or low by using the same
values from Bragger et al.’s (1998) study, as displayed in the Appendix.
Feedback was identical for the first two investment opportunities for all
participants and indicated that profits were above costs.
In the failing scenario, mean costs were above profits. The variability of
the 12 feedback points was determined to be about twice as large for the
uncertain condition (SD  $4,915) as for the relatively certain condition
(SD  $1,844). In the failing scenario, mean costs were $5,000 above
profits for both conditions. If participants continued to invest for more
than 14 opportunities (the first 2 identical feedback statements and the 12
manipulated feedback statements), the set of 12 points was repeatedly
generated in a random order until participants ran out of funds or decided
to exit the scenario (with the mean remaining at $5,000).
In the prior experience scenario, the financial feedback that investors
received following the first two investments was programmed into the
computer in a particular order for the high and low uncertainty conditions
so that mean profits were slightly above costs, on average, for all condi-
tions. If participants continued to invest for more than 14 opportunities (the
first 2 identical feedback statements and the 12 manipulated feedback
statements), the set of 12 points was repeatedly generated in a random
order until participants ran out of funds or decided to exit the scenario (with
mean profits remaining at $400).
Information acquisition. Participants were randomly assigned to either
an information available or an information not available condition. In the
information available condition, participants were asked at each investment
opportunity if they wanted to purchase information summarizing past and
present financial conditions as well as qualitative information about the
future financial market that could affect them. The cost of the information
was $3,000 in both scenarios and was deducted from the maximum amount
of resources they could invest each month and from the total resources they
were able to invest. The information provided in the information available
condition was similar in both scenarios except that the qualitative feedback
reflected the nature of the computer software industry presented in the
initial scenario.
Dependent Measures
The dependent variables were the number of times invested and the total
amount invested.
Analyses
As has been operationalized in the literature, we measured escalation
(Bragger et al., 1998; Hantula & Bragger, 1999; Moon, 2001a, 2001b;
Staw, 1976) by comparing investment between conditions. A 2 (uncertain-
ty level)  2 (information acquisition)  2 (experience in a previous
investment scenario) analysis of variance tested the effects of the indepen-
dent variables on total investment, and effect size r (Rosenthal & Rosnow,
1991) reported the main and interaction effects. In addition, we conducted
survival analyses to determine if the three independent variables affected
investment persistence in the experiment by trial. In survival analysis, a
hazard rate indicates the number of participants who start to invest in a
particular investment period but who withdraw before the next opportunity
(Bragger et al., 1998; McCain, 1986). A cumulative survival rate indicates
what proportion of participants remain in the situation in progressive trials.
Analysis of survival scores produces a chi-square statistic testing the null
hypothesis that the subgroups are part of the same survival distribution
(SPSS, Inc., 1999). The phi coefficient was reported as a measure of effect
size (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). To assess whether more information
decreased the likelihood of investment persistence, we conducted a corre-
lation between the percentage of times participants in the information
acquisition condition purchased information and the amount invested. To
determine whether participants increased investment from the initial sce-
nario to the second failing scenario, a one-tailed paired t test was con-
ducted, and effect size r (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) was reported. A
second survival analysis also determined whether participants who took
part in both scenarios invested in more trials during the second scenario.
Perception Measures
Perception measures from Bragger et al. (1998) were presented offline to
all participants after the fifth and last investments to determine whether
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participants felt responsible for the decisions they had made and to check
the uncertainty manipulations.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Perceived responsibility was above the midpoint for all condi-
tions for the mid- and end-experiment assessments in both sections
of the experiment, and there were no differences in perceived
responsibility for participants in the relatively certain and rela-
tively uncertain groups or for participants with or without experi-
ence in a previous decision-making scenario. Participants in the
uncertain condition perceived more uncertainty than did partici-
pants in the lower uncertainty condition in the mid- and end-
manipulation checks, but there were no differences in perceived
uncertainty between participants who had experience in a previous
decision-making scenario and those who did not.
Dependent Variables
Focused tests and survival analyses were used to test the hy-
potheses. Means and standard deviations for dependent variables
are reported in Table 1, and Figure 1 shows total investment for all
conditions.
Uncertainty effects. Participants who received relatively un-
certain feedback invested more resources per trial than did partic-
ipants who received relatively certain feedback, F(1, 128)  4.8,
p  .03, r  .19. Survival analysis indicated that the median
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables
Condition
Dollars invested, including
information costs No. of trials invested
Relatively certain, information, experience
M 37,150 11.7
SD 35,678 9.9
Relatively certain, information, no experience
M 27,895 11.8
SD 27,408 10.8
Relatively uncertain, information, experience
M 62,333 17.3
SD 35,678 13.5
Relatively uncertain, information, no experience
M 37,063 10.6
SD 34,774 8.0
Relatively certain, no information, experience
M 72,786 21.3
SD 35,555 11.9
Relatively certain, no information, no experience
M 37,157 11.8
SD 39,612 13.2
Relatively uncertain, no information, experience
M 67,333 17.3
SD 37,961 9.1
Relatively uncertain, no information, no experience
M 66,095 17.2
SD 38,064 12.4
Relatively certain
M 41,639 13.6
SD 36,083 11.9
Relatively uncertain
M 58,421 15.6
SD 38,048 11.1
Information available
M 39,015 12.4
SD 32,788 10.5
Information not available
M 59,754 16.6
SD 39,781 12.1
Prior experience
M 57,704 16.3
SD 36,556 11.3
No prior experience
M 42,893 13.0
SD 37,781 11.5
Overall
M 49,536 14.5
SD 37,829 11.5
9HISTORY AND HYSTERESIS
number of investment trials for the high uncertainty condition (15
trials) was not significantly higher than the median number of
investment trials for the low uncertainty condition (11.15 trials),
although there was a small-to-medium effect size for this analysis
(  .13).
Information effects. Participants with no opportunity to pur-
chase information invested more resources per trial than did par-
ticipants with the opportunity to purchase information, F(1,
128) 11.6, p .001, r .29. Survival analysis indicated that the
median number of investment trials for the information available
manipulation was 9.83 trials, significantly lower than the median
number of investment trials for the information not available
condition of 15.23 trials, 2(1, N 136) 4.56, p .03,  .18.
A significant negative correlation was found between the percent-
age of opportunities in which information was purchased and total
funds invested, r (66)  .44, p  .00.
Prior experience effects. Participants with previous experience
in a more profitable scenario invested more during failure than did
those without prior experience, F(1, 128) 7.51, p .01, r .24.
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2, the median number of
trials invested in the prior experience condition was 14.46 trials,
whereas the median number of trials invested in the no prior
experience condition was 10.75 trials, a statistically significant
difference, 2(1, N  136)  4.07, p  .04,   .17.
Within-group analyses. Only participants who were in the
prior experience manipulation condition and who participated in
both of the investment scenarios were included in this analysis.
Seven participants who were in the prior experience manipulation
did not complete the second scenario, reducing the number who
participated in both scenarios to a total of 61. Because hypotheses
predicted the direction of the differences, a one-tailed paired t test
was conducted, showing that those who participated in the initial
decision-making scenario significantly increased their total invest-
ment from the initial scenario (M  $45,103) to the second failing
scenario (M  $57,704), t(60)  1.88, p  .032, r  .24, and, as
can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 2, invested in fewer trials
during the initial scenario (Mdn  11.25) than they invested in the
failing scenario (Mdn  14.46), 2(1, N  61)  3.81, p  .05,
  .18.
Discussion
Participants receiving equivocal feedback on their decisions
invested more money and invested across more opportunities;
those who could purchase information invested fewer resources
and exited sooner than did participants who did not have the
opportunity to purchase information, and there was an inverse
linear relationship between the percentage of opportunities in
which participants purchased information (for those able to pur-
chase information) and total resources invested. Prior experience
in a more successful venture led to later increased investing when
participants were faced with failure, even above that invested in a
preceding, succeeding scenario. These results not only replicate
the equivocality, information, and hysteresis effects of Bragger et
al. (1998) but also extend this research to show that earlier success
can sow the seeds of future failure.
Experience in earlier decision-making situations may teach de-
cision makers how to invest in the future (Chi & Nystrom, 1995;
McCain, 1986), a line of reasoning that these history effects,
found 6 weeks after the initial success experience, support. The
present results, along with those of Bragger et al. (1998), Goltz
(1992, 1993), Hantula and Bragger (1999), and Hantula and Crow-
ell (1994), specify that, in particular, it is a variable history of
returns earlier in an investment situation that can teach decision
makers to continue to invest when feedback from an investment
turns negative. Previous persistence in similar successful situations
Figure 1. Mean total investment including the cost of information for all conditions. Info  information;
Exp  experience.
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is reinforced; the extent to which a subsequent situation resembles
that which went before should contribute to any escalation and
persistence effects. The fact that history effects were found after a
period of weeks (rather than in-session) in the present study
suggests that the increased investing in the second scenario is less
an issue of momentum (Goltz, 1999) and more an issue of learning
and generalization. Indeed, Garland et al. (1990) found larger
effects in a well-drilling escalation scenario with professional
petroleum geologists (who presumably had met with past suc-
cesses in this venture) than with university students (who had no
experience), which is consistent with the learning and generaliza-
tion account of escalation presented herein. Assessment of the
manipulation checks indicated that perceived responsibility and
perceived uncertainty did not differ between participants who had
prior experience in an initial decision-making scenario and those
who did not, suggesting that these factors are not causing the
differences found.
Equivocality engenders escalation and information search. The
present study joins a growing body of research and theory in
questioning the degree to which a failure of rationality is an issue
in escalation and hysteresis (Bowen, 1987; Bragger et al., 1998;
Busby & Pitts, 1995; Dixit, 1989a, 1992; Drummond, 1998;
George & Morisset, 1993; Goltz, 1992, 1993, 1999; Hantula &
Bragger, 1999; Hantula & Crowell, 1994; Hubbard, 1994; Inger-
soll & Ross, 1992; Pindyck, 1993; Price, 1995). The data and
learning perspective of escalation presented herein run counter to
an account of escalation as necessarily irrational behavior. Instead,
to the degree that learning is akin to adaptation, escalation may
result from rational responses to an uncertain world in which
decision makers are poised on the precipice of the present, peering
into an unknowable future with only an imperfect past to guide
them as they try to make sense of the conflicting, competing, and
confusing information surrounding them. However, in a stock
market simulation study without an explicit failure phase, DiFonzo
and Bordia (1997) found that investors strayed farther from ratio-
nal decision making when they had access to useless or random
information than when they had no information at all, raising
questions regarding whether the credibility and the nature of
information sources, type of information (Conlon & Parks, 1987),
and the ease in accessing information will moderate effects of in-
formation on decision making in success versus failure situations.
The present research was conducted to bridge methodological
gaps between experimental organizational research and experi-
mental economics by addressing issues of external validity and
realism important in organizations and issues of internal validity
important in eliminating plausible rival hypotheses (Camerer,
1995; Roth, 1995). Participants worked in an interactive mi-
croworld environment (DiFonzo et al., 1998), invested as many or
as few times as they wished, and received feedback on their
decisions until they had invested all of these resources. This
dynamic methodology is more psychologically engaging and has
improved external validity over escalation studies that feature
static scenarios and allow participants to invest only once (e.g.,
Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Bazerman et al., 1982; Moon, 2001a,
2001b; Staw, 1976). External validity was also increased by pro-
viding participants with real financial incentives to make the most
profitable decisions and by building a systematic replication of
Bragger et al. (1998) into the procedure. Replication is of critical
importance in organizational research (Easley, Madden, & Dunn,
2000), especially so in the case of escalation with the numerous
failures to replicate Staw’s (1976) original self-justification ef-
fects, even when using the same materials (e.g., Armstrong, Cov-
iello, & Sanfranek, 1993; Goltz, 1993; McCain, 1986; Singer &
Singer, 1985; Staw & Fox, 1977). Although the current research
used an undergraduate population, as is common with much lab-
oratory research on decision making, results from various escala-
tion experiments have shown similar results whether participants
were undergraduate students or more experienced masters of busi-
ness administration students (Armstrong et al., 1993) or profes-
sionals in their field (Garland et al., 1990).
Experimental studies of Bowen’s (1987) and Dixit’s (1992)
hypotheses, such as the current research, Bragger et al. (1998), and
Hantula and Bragger (1999), have advanced an interdisciplinary
synthesis of theory and method escalation of commitment in social
and organizational psychology and of hysteresis in economics.
Combined with research demonstrating how decision making dur-
ing financial failure may result from learning that occurs from
decision makers’ history of prior decision-making experiences
Figure 2. Cumulative survival of participants who had and did not have
experience in a prior investment scenario (top panel) and cumulative
survival of participants who invested in both scenarios in the initial
investment scenario and in the second failing investment scenario (bottom
panel).
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(Chi & Nystrom, 1995; Goltz, 1992, 1993, 1999; Hantula &
Crowell, 1994; McCain, 1986), these studies show how interplay
between psychology and economics can provide new answers to
puzzling questions (Beil, 1996; Lea, 1978; Lunt, 1996). However,
not addressed in this study were the potential terminological con-
flicts between these fields. The term uncertainty is used in eco-
nomics to describe highly variable data regarding an investment
(e.g., Dixit, 1989a, 1989b); equivocality is used to describe feed-
back for which multiple positive and negative interpretations may
be constructed (Bowen, 1987) or a lack of pattern or predictability
in feedback (Hantula & Bragger, 1999). Conceptually, they are
nearly identical and, in fact, are often used synonymously in the
organizational literature (e.g., Bowen, 1987; Bragger et al., 1998;
Drummond, 1997; Hantula & Bragger, 1999).
Further studies using the current microworld methodology
(DiFonzo et al., 1998) to investigate other factors that may affect
escalation and persistence of commitment situations in conjunction
with other methodologies, such as post hoc case analysis (Drum-
mond, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Staw et al., 1997; Staw & Huang,
1995) and in-depth interviewing and content analysis of reports of
escalation and persistence of commitment (Lind, Kutcher, Brag-
ger, & Hantula, 1999), are likely to untangle the uncertainty
around escalation and increase understanding of the phenomenon
that has piqued the interest of economists and social and organi-
zational psychologists for more than 2 decades.
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Appendix
Feedback Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Autocorrelation
Through Lag 4 by Condition
Variable
Uncertainty level
Low High
Investment period
1 $6,000 $6,000
2 $2,000 $2,000
3 $5,200 $500
4 $6,500 $9,000
5 $4,900 $1,700
6 $400 $2,000
7 $6,200 $9,600
8 $5,400 $8,000
9 $5,000 $1,000
10 $6,100 $11,700
11 $4,600 $600
12 $5,100 $10,000
13 $4,800 $1,500
14 $6,700 $9,000
M $5,000 $5,000
SD $1,844 $4,915
Autocorrelations
Lag 1 .07 (.70) .00 (.99)
Lag 2 .06 (.93) .23 (.61)
Lag 3 .10 (.95) .02 (.80)
Lag 4 .07 (.98) .27 (.63)
Note. Reproduced from Bragger et al., 1998. P values are in parentheses.
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